Intensive Science & Virtual Philosophy has ratings and 26 reviews. Here Manuel DeLanda makes sense of Deleuze for both analytic and continental. Nov 24, Regardless, what Delanda has done in this “already classic” book (back cover blurb) is to develop a notion of individuation, the virtual, and the. Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy cuts to the heart of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and of today’s science the start of the 21st Century.
|Published (Last):||12 September 2018|
|PDF File Size:||6.34 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||14.89 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Want to Read saving…. Want to Read Currently Reading Read. Refresh and try again. Open Preview See a Problem?
Intensive Science & Virtual Philosophy
Thanks for telling us about the problem. Return to Book Page. Deleuze is now regarded as the most radical and influential of contemporary philosophers. Here Manuel DeLanda makes sense of Deleuze for both analytic and continental thought, for both science and philosophy. Paperbackpages. Published August 14th by Bloomsbury Academic first published To see what your intensivee thought of this book, please sign up.
Lists with This Book. This book is not yet featured on Listopia. Jan 16, Niklas rated it really liked it Shelves: Usually, I don’t pen reviews, but since this book, which I consider to be important in the field of Deleuze studies, hasn’t received any actual criticism but has had been discussed as an important artefact in the question of whether or not Deleuze and Guattari ought to be exonerated of the most heinous crime of employing a vocabulary that draws on a wide range of sources, among them how dare they!
The book consists out of four parts save the short introduction ; four chapters and an appendix. The four parts are as follows: An explanation of Deuleuze’s usage of mathematics chapter 1 ; 2. Deleuze’s ontology ddlanda 2 to 3 ; 3. Deleuze’s epistemology chapter 4 ; 4.
As many people know these days, DeLanda considers Deleuze to be a realist. DeLanda takes a paramount interest in ontology and relegates epistemology to just one chapter, which reflects DeLanda’s Deleuzian outlook. Other than engaging in this, in delwnda mind facile, discussion of realism vs. This is done primarily in the first chapter, where DeLanda shows how decidedly mathematical Deleuze’s conception of subjectivity is. This is both worthwile scidnce demanding; I’d highly recommend it. A philsophy, the author says, is: Here DeLanda fleshes out his infamous flat ontology, which is made “exclusively of unique, singular individuals, differeing in spatio-temporal scale but not in ontological status” DeLanda Such an ontology leaves no room for reified totalities e.
Rather, an ontology of the actual, virtual and intensity, constitute the explicity non-essentialist “nature” of being. In the appendix, DeLanda wraps things up, and produces an ontological list, which names ten decisive aspects of Deleuze’s ontology.
Would I recommend this book? Yes, I would, if one is interested in Deleuze and wishes to go beyond the usual prattling about how diversity is really important and how difference is everything and how one ought to be rhizomatic etc. I am still unsure about the idea of a flat ontology, and its implications.
Latour does “flat ontology” rather well, and so does Garcia, but looking at Harman, I am not entirely convinced this is the right way. Markus Gabriel, a new “Elend der Sciwnce povery of philosophy is a good example of what might happen if one pursues this line: I am a simple man, and I prefer my philosophy straightforward and Anglo-Saxon.
With its bewildering array of terminology, this exhibits the worst excesses of Continental philosophy, intended more to obfuscate than to elucidate. The basic programme of the book, to provide a replacement for essentialism, seems to be solving a problem which isn’t, and the proposed solution is neither clear nor convincing. I found de Landa’s habit of cherry-picking examples from other disciplines sckence be particularly a I am a simple man, and I prefer my philosophy straightforward and Anglo-Saxon.
I found de Landa’s habit of cherry-picking examples from other disciplines to be particularly annoying: I wonder if an embryologist phlosophy a physicist or a mathematician would feel that de Landa had accurately represented the work in their discipline, or whether he is just throwing out examples in an attempt to add some credibility to his specious argumentation.
If metaphysics is nonsense, then this is as nonsensical as it gets. Jun 30, Kane Faucher rated it really liked it. Rather than going back to worship at the temple of Deleuze, DeLanda’s polymathic interdisciplinary approach pushes well beyond the comfort zones of orthodox Deleuzianism although I recognize the oxymoron of “orthodox” and “Deleuze!
On Delanda’s Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy | Media Assemblages
Feb 28, Richard Smyth rated it it was amazing Shelves: Delanda draws from a variety of scientific and mathematical fields in the process of explaining their sciebce. It’s good and smart and whatever but I still think a realist reading of deleuze is the most buzzkilly thing ever.
Oct scisnce, Al Matthews rated it really liked it Shelves: More thesis avoidance; this is actually a useful book about vectors, and why math is interesting just to think about. Songs of Mathematical Innocence, and Inexperience. Jan 08, Gracchus Babeuf rated it really liked it. The first chapter of this book is mandatory reading for understanding the mathematical concepts Deleuze uses. Aug 14, Daniel rated it really liked it.
Though I still don’t trust Deleuze or his diehard followers, this book did give me philozophy respect for his work. In Intensive Science and Virtual PhilosophyDeLanda tries to bring Deleuze’s ontology into sciencf with modern mathematics and virtuual. Not that Deleuze didn’t know about modern developments. Rather, DeLanda tries to make Deleuze’s brief and cryptic references to the sciences and mathematics understandable. Throughout, DeLanda argues that the essences and universals of traditional ontol Though I still don’t trust Deleuze or his diehard followers, this book did give me more respect for his work.
Throughout, DeLanda argues that the essences and universals of traditional ontology arise out of historical and intensive processes.
In the first two chapters, DeLanda examines Deleuze’s idea of ‘multiplicities’. Roughly, multiplicities act through the attractions singularities exert. No actual objects are singularities; rather, singularities are non-actual attractors which direct and form possible trajectories or paths which are then, depending on such circumstances, occasionally actualized.
They are the asymptotes that phenomena running along trajectories or paths approach but never realize: Such multiplicities of singularities are real insofar as they can be studied and have effects, but they are not actual because they are never fulfilled by actual phenomena; hence, as DeLanda explains, multiplicities are virtual.
By resorting to virtual multiplicities, DeLanda through Deleuze tries to interpret the spacial-qualitative world we are familiar with as being fundamentally produced through the interactions between topological intensities and attractors. Just as projective transformations reduce differences between objects “in projective geometry all conic sections, without further qualification, are the same” 17space extension and qualities are ultimately derived from intensive quantities.
Space and quality, which have been so fundamental to the study of essences, actually conceal their intensive origins: In the third chapter, DeLanda turns to Deleuze’s theory of time. Here, he claims that time arises out of the relations obtaining between different processes, the speeds of which depend on how they perceive and are perceived the movement of glass as compared to liquid glass As DeLanda explains, “[a] process may change too slowly or too fast in relation to another process, the relationship between their temporal scales determining in part their respective capacities to affect one another” Moreover, since all entities in the world perceive – everything interacts both actively and passively with everything else an entities is not fully understood until we know how it interacts with other entities – all entities have their own unique time.
Time, therefore, is not absolute but produced through perception or interaction between contrasting and embedded processes. In the final chapter, DeLanda seems to criticize two views of science: The problem with this position is that it falls into the same trap as essentialism. That is, it does not believe that laws have histories and can be produced and overcome.
On the other hand, DeLanda criticizes those who deny the reality of laws, believing them to be ‘useful fictions’. By contrast, DeLanda, following Deleuze, argues that physical and biological ‘laws’ are real but produced; they are subject to change as these same entities continue to interact and affect each other. The Emergence of Synthetic Reasonbut I was reluctant to read Intensive Science and Virtual PhilosophyManuel De Landa’s attempt to extend and present the work of Gilles Deleuze to physical scientists with an interest in philosophy.
While I’m right in the target demographic by interest and history, if not current professionI think of Deleuze as a canonical example of the deliberately I had previously read and adored both A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History and Philosophy and Simulation: While I’m right in the target demographic by interest and history, if not current professionI think of Deleuze as a canonical example of the deliberately incomprehensible French philosopher trope and that was enough to push me away.
Props to Ribbonfarmfor convincing me to give it a go. I’m still fuzzy on parts of the book De Landa does quote Deleuze liberally, after allbut what I have absorbed has resonated deeply with my scientific and philosophical intuitions.
In De Landa’s version of Deleuzian metaphysics, entities in the world are classified philosopjy to the process that form them, not according to some imagined ideal model they resemble. The most accessible example is the evolutionary view philosolhy species, virtuaal the shared history of reproductive isolation and gradual pressure make two animals members of the same class, not the shared traits that cause them to superficially resemble each other.
The resemblance is viewed as the consequence of the process, rather than being primary, and thus variation among specimens is expected rather than surprising. When debugging, I forget at my peril that the source code is not the software, but that each instance of the application acquires variation through exposure to its environment.
This was one of philosopphy most challenging books I’ve read in a long time. Some prior background with nonlinear dynamics Chaos: The Making of a New Science would be a good start goes a long way, but even with that, I found the middle two chapters rough going. It explores similar themes, but much more concretely. Delanda presents a fairly erudite examination of Deleuze’s virtual philosophy. Here, Delanda shies away from using much of Deleuze and Guattari’s imaginative language, seeking to verify it instead using mathematics and science.
While this intensely interesting, Delanda does some less versed readers of Deleuze and Guattari a service by approaching the subject matter tangentially. In a way, Delanda actually violates some of Deleuzes aesthetics with virrual explanation by presenting a set view of phil Delanda scirnce a fairly erudite examination of Deleuze’s virtual philosophy.
In a way, Delanda actually violates some of Deleuzes aesthetics with this explanation by presenting a set view of philosophy and science as though there was a singular procedure by which Deleuze and Guattari sought to delands. Nonetheless, Delanda does an excellent job approaching Deleuze and Guattari’s work and connecting it to some more recent phenomenon within science and mathematics. To some degree this can be thought of as just one aspect of Deleuze and Guattari, but it is one which readers of Deleuze and Guattari often miss because the intemsive of their examination is so different form the analytic “pragmatism” with which science and math are often presented.
To some degree, Delanda could have grounded his discussion more with Deleuze’s work, although he left this at the appendix which provides some trace yes, but also obscures the presentation to some degree.